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# -*- coding: utf-8 -*-
"""
oauthlib.oauth1.rfc5849.endpoints.signature_only
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
This module is an implementation of the signing logic of OAuth 1.0 RFC 5849.
"""
from __future__ import absolute_import, unicode_literals
import logging
from .base import BaseEndpoint
from .. import errors
log = logging.getLogger(__name__)
class SignatureOnlyEndpoint(BaseEndpoint):
"""An endpoint only responsible for verifying an oauth signature."""
def validate_request(self, uri, http_method='GET',
body=None, headers=None):
"""Validate a signed OAuth request.
:param uri: The full URI of the token request.
:param http_method: A valid HTTP verb, i.e. GET, POST, PUT, HEAD, etc.
:param body: The request body as a string.
:param headers: The request headers as a dict.
:returns: A tuple of 2 elements.
1. True if valid, False otherwise.
2. An oauthlib.common.Request object.
"""
try:
request = self._create_request(uri, http_method, body, headers)
except errors.OAuth1Error:
return False, None
try:
self._check_transport_security(request)
self._check_mandatory_parameters(request)
except errors.OAuth1Error:
return False, request
if not self.request_validator.validate_timestamp_and_nonce(
request.client_key, request.timestamp, request.nonce, request):
return False, request
# The server SHOULD return a 401 (Unauthorized) status code when
# receiving a request with invalid client credentials.
# Note: This is postponed in order to avoid timing attacks, instead
# a dummy client is assigned and used to maintain near constant
# time request verification.
#
# Note that early exit would enable client enumeration
valid_client = self.request_validator.validate_client_key(
request.client_key, request)
if not valid_client:
request.client_key = self.request_validator.dummy_client
valid_signature = self._check_signature(request)
# log the results to the validator_log
# this lets us handle internal reporting and analysis
request.validator_log['client'] = valid_client
request.validator_log['signature'] = valid_signature
# We delay checking validity until the very end, using dummy values for
# calculations and fetching secrets/keys to ensure the flow of every
# request remains almost identical regardless of whether valid values
# have been supplied. This ensures near constant time execution and
# prevents malicious users from guessing sensitive information
v = all((valid_client, valid_signature))
if not v:
log.info("[Failure] request verification failed.")
log.info("Valid client: %s", valid_client)
log.info("Valid signature: %s", valid_signature)
return v, request
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