%PDF- <> %âãÏÓ endobj 2 0 obj <> endobj 3 0 obj <>/ExtGState<>/ProcSet[/PDF/Text/ImageB/ImageC/ImageI] >>/Annots[ 28 0 R 29 0 R] /MediaBox[ 0 0 595.5 842.25] /Contents 4 0 R/Group<>/Tabs/S>> endobj ºaâÚÎΞ-ÌE1ÍØÄ÷{òò2ÿ ÛÖ^ÔÀá TÎ{¦?§®¥kuµùÕ5sLOšuY>endobj 2 0 obj<>endobj 2 0 obj<>endobj 2 0 obj<>endobj 2 0 obj<> endobj 2 0 obj<>endobj 2 0 obj<>es 3 0 R>> endobj 2 0 obj<> ox[ 0.000000 0.000000 609.600000 935.600000]/Fi endobj 3 0 obj<> endobj 7 1 obj<>/ProcSet[/PDF/Text/ImageB/ImageC/ImageI]>>/Subtype/Form>> stream
Git v2.13.7 Release Notes ========================= Fixes since v2.13.6 ------------------- * Submodule "names" come from the untrusted .gitmodules file, but we blindly append them to $GIT_DIR/modules to create our on-disk repo paths. This means you can do bad things by putting "../" into the name. We now enforce some rules for submodule names which will cause Git to ignore these malicious names (CVE-2018-11235). Credit for finding this vulnerability and the proof of concept from which the test script was adapted goes to Etienne Stalmans. * It was possible to trick the code that sanity-checks paths on NTFS into reading random piece of memory (CVE-2018-11233). Credit for fixing for these bugs goes to Jeff King, Johannes Schindelin and others.